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Showing posts with label Law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Law. Show all posts

Sunday, 28 August 2011

Harun Rashid Khan - Deputy governor of RBI


Harun Rashid Khan is new deputy governor of RBI


Harun Rashid Khan on Monday assumed charge as Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India for a period of three years.
Mr. Khan replaces Shyamala Gopinath who retired last month, RBI said in a statement.
As one of the deputy governors of the apex bank, Mr. Khan will look after the Central Security Cell, Department of External Investments and Operations, Department of Government and Bank Accounts, Department of Payment and Settlement Systems, Foreign Exchange Department, Internal Debt Management Department and Inspection Department.
Prior to this appointment, Mr. Khan was Executive Director of RBI.
He had served in that position since October 2007 and looked after the Department of External Investments and Operations, Foreign Exchange Department, Internal Debt Management Department and Department of Government and Bank Accounts.
He was earlier Regional Director of RBI’s New Delhi Office and and had also served as Principal of the College of Agricultural Banking in Pune.
With a career spanning over 32 years, Mr. Khan had worked in diverse fields of specialisation like rural credit, currency management, banking supervision and regulation, debt management, reserve management, exchange control, personnel administration and internal accounts.
Mr. Khan has also been associated with number of committees both within and outside the RBI, including Committee on Technology Exports, Committee on Ways and Means Advances to the State Governments, Working Group on Instruments of Sterilisation and International Task Force on Central Counter-parties.
He also chaired the internal group of RBI on Rural Credit and Microfinance.
Based on the recommendations of that committee, known as the Khan Committee, the RBI had issued guidelines to expand the banking outreach through business facilitators and business correspondents with information and communication technology support for spearheading financial inclusion in the country.
Khan was also earlier the nominee director of RBI on the boards of Dena Bank, Bank of Maharashtra, Punjab and Sind Bank, Bank of Rajasthan and the Orissa State Finance Corporation.
The RBI has four deputy governors looking after various departments.
In his latest position, Mr. Khan joins Subir Gokarn, K.C. Chakrabarty and Anand Sinha who also serve as deputy governors of the central bank.

Rohinton Nariman - Solicitor General of India


Senior lawyer Rohinton Nariman was on Wednesday appointed the Solicitor General of India after the Appointments Committee of Cabinet approved his name, sources in the Law Ministry said.
Nariman, 54, son of eminent jurist Fali S Nariman, replaces Gopal Subramanium who resigned to protest Nariman’s appointment, without his knowledge, as special government counsel in a 2G spectrum allocation scam case.
Nariman has argued a number of constitutional and corporate cases in the Supreme Court and high courts. He, with senior advocate Harish Salve, argued for Mukesh Ambani’s RIL in the dispute over the supply and pricing of gas from KG basin between the Ambani brothers.
Nariman was designated a senior advocate at age 37 in 1993 when the then CJI M N Venkatachaliah amended the rules to reduce the limit of the minimum age of 45 years for designating a lawyer as a senior advocate.
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Monday, 18 July 2011

The Hindu : News / National : Court order goes against Doctrine of Separation of Powers: Centre

The Hindu : News / National : Court order goes against Doctrine of Separation of Powers: Centre


The Centre, while seeking to recall/modify the July 4 Supreme Court order on the black money issue, has disputed the finding that certain admissions and concessions were made by the government counsel during the course of hearing of the petition filed by the former Union Law Minister, Ram Jethmalani.
On July 15, the Centre filed an application for recall of the order (briefly published on July 16). According to the application (a copy of which is obtained by The Hindu), “The order proceeds on the admission, concessions, statements and acknowledgements attributed to counsel appearing for the Union of India. Such concessions, statements, admissions and acknowledgements do not appear to have been made and, therefore, the order proceeds on an incorrect factual basis.”
“Without jurisdiction”
It said: “The order is without jurisdiction in as much as it impinges upon and goes contrary to the legally well-established Doctrine of Separation of Powers. It is contrary to the settled legal principle that the function of the court is to see that Lawful Authority is duly exercised by the Executive, and not to take over itself the tasks entrusted to the Executive. It impinges upon the well-settled principle that courts do not interfere with the Economic Policy, which is in the domain of the Executive and that it is not the function of the court to sit in judgment over matters of Economic Policy, which must necessarily be left to the expert bodies. Courts do not supplant the views of experts with its own views.”
The Centre said: “The order impinges upon the principle that in matters of utilities, tax and economic policy, legislation and regulation cases, the court exercises judicial self-restraint if not judicial deference to the acts of the Executive, since the Executive has obligations and responsibility both constitutionally and statutorily. The discussions of economic theories and the wide-ranging criticism of the state in paras 1 to 20 are uncalled for, unjustified and made without any discussion in court or material therefore.”
The order “has the effect of completely eliminating the role and denuding the constitutional responsibility of the Executive, which itself is answerable to Parliament, and it directly interferes with the functions and obligations of the Executive, more particularly, since it is ordered that the Special Investigation Team will report directly to the Supreme Court, therefore excluding the Executive, and consequently Parliament also.
Steps taken
Explaining the steps to recover black money, the Centre said: “The government has detected an unaccounted income of Rs.18,750 crore in the last two financial years alone, due to focussed search and seizure operations by the Income Tax Department in India. The sharp focus on mispricing, which is one of the main and new methods of transfer of illicit funds outside the country, has resulted in detection of mispricing of Rs.33,784 crore in the last two financial years, as against detection of mispricing of Rs.14,655 crore in the previous five financial years. The special attention on cross-border transactions and business deals has resulted in collection of taxes of Rs.22, 697crore in the last financial year.”
On steps to retrieve black money stashed away abroad, the application said: “India has initiated the process of negotiations with 74 countries to broaden the scope of the Article concerning Exchange of Information to specifically allow for exchange of banking information and information without domestic interest. As on date, it has completed negotiations with 19 existing DTAA countries to update this Article. These agreements have also been initialled. Eighteen new DTAAs have also been finalised where the Exchange of Information Article is in line with international standards.”

Saturday, 16 July 2011

Directive Principles of State Policy

DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICY IN INDIA

An important feature of the constitution is the Directive Principles of State Policy. Although the Directive Principles are asserted to be "fundamental in the governance of the country," they are not legally enforceable. Instead, they are guidelines for creating a social order characterized by social, economic, and political justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity as enunciated in the constitution's preamble.
The Forty-second Amendment, which came into force in January 1977, attempted to raise the status of the Directive Principles by stating that no law implementing any of the Directive Principles could be declared unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated any of the Fundamental Rights. The amendment simultaneously stated that laws prohibiting "antinational activities" or the formation of "antinational associations" could not be invalidated because they infringed on any of the Fundamental Rights. It added a new section to the constitution on "Fundamental Duties" that enjoined citizens "to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood among all the people of India, transcending religious, linguistic and regional or sectional diversities." However, the amendment reflected a new emphasis in governing circles on order and discipline to counteract what some leaders had come to perceive as the excessively freewheeling style of Indian democracy. After the March 1977 general election ended the control of the Congress (Congress (R) from 1969) over the executive and legislature for the first time since independence in 1947, the new Janata-dominated Parliament passed the Forty-third Amendment (1977) and Forty-fourth Amendment (1978). These amendments revoked the Forty-second Amendment's provision that Directive Principles take precedence over Fundamental Rights and also curbed Parliament's power to legislate against "antinational activities.”
The Directive Principles of State DPSP are Policy (contained in part IV, articles 36 to 50,) of the Indian Constitution. Many of the provisions correspond to the provisions of the ICESCR. For instance, article 43 provides that the state shall endeavor to secure, by suitable legislation or economic organization or in any other way, to all workers, agricultural, industrial or otherwise, work, a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural opportunities, and in particular the state shall endeavor to promote cottage industries on an individual or cooperative basis in rural areas. This corresponds more or less to articles 11 and 15 of the ICESCR. However, some of the ICESCR rights, for instance, the right to health (art. 12), have been interpreted by the Indian Supreme Court to form part of the right to life under article 21 of the Constitution, thus making it directly enforceable and justiciable. As a party to the ICESCR, the Indian legislature has enacted laws giving effect to some of its treaty obligations and these laws are in turn enforceable in and by the courts.
Article 37 of the Constitution declares that the DPSP “shall not be enforceable by any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the state to apply these principles in making laws.” It is not a mere coincidence that the apparent distinction that is drawn by scholars between the ICCPR rights and ESC rights holds good for the distinction that is drawn in the Indian context between fundamental rights and DPSP. Thus the bar to justiciability of the DPSP is spelled out in some sense in the Constitution itself.
It was said by several members in the Constituent Assembly that the directive principles are superfluous or mere guidelines or pious principles or instructions. They have no binding force on the State. In his speech Dr. Ambedkar answered.
“ The directive principles are like instruments of instructions which were issued to the Governor in General and Governors of colonies and to those of India by the British Government under the 1935 Act under the Draft Constitution. It is proposed to issue such instructions to the president and governors. The text of these instruments of the instructions shall be found in scheduled IV to the Constitution of India. What are called directive principles is that they are instructions to the Legislature and the Executive. Such a thing is, to my mind, to be welcomed. Wherever there is grant or power in general terms for peace, order and good government that it is necessary that it should be accompanied by the instructions regulating its exercise.” It was never intended by Dr. Ambedkar that the Directive Principles had no legal force but had moral effect while educating members of the Government and the legislature, nor can it be said that the answer referred to necessarily implied with the Directive Principles had no legal force.

Thursday, 14 July 2011

Domestic Violence Act 2005

Violence and domestic abuse are considered a man’s most heinous, intolerable and deleterious weapon and rightfully, violence in a relationship is inhuman behavior in its most pernicious form, which would be anything but acceptable. There had been a significant lacuna in the legal system to accommodate for cases of everyday domestic violence in the lives of women, something that has been restricted to the private domain. But this Act now seeks to eliminate this lacuna and eradicate the evil of domestic violence. Nonetheless, while providing for remedy, the Act has created various openings and prospects for abuse and misuse of this Act.The Domestic Violence Act is the latest mischievous sprite introduced to conform to the concept of protective discrimination by making special provisions for women. The Act certainly provides for shielding women from any sort of domestic violence in a relationship and the Act has specifies a comprehensive definition of domestic violence. In S.3 of the 2005 Act, domestic violence is defined in terms of mental, physical, sexual, verbal, emotional and economic abuse. But despite of having such a virtuous intention, its ambiguous realization has paved way for a great controversy with feminist groups and men contributingly harping for equality as this Act has the potential of being used by women to harass men. This law was enacted by keeping in view the rights guaranteed under Articles 14,15 and 21 of the Constitution to provide for a remedy under the civil law, which is intended to protect the woman from being victims of domestic violence and to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the society . But this Act on the contrary, has provided for an elaborate mechanism for abuse by women and has certainly become a glaring example of inequality. The feminist groups unequivocally and unanimously hail the implementation of the Act while men think of being ransacked of all of their marital rights. The likelihood of it being misused is so immensely incalculable that it has given wakeful nights to men and has left his fate to the whims and fancies of their counterparts. This article will provide and insight into the Act and highlight the draconian nature of the Act through its anomalies and inherent ambiguities.

Legislative History
Before the inception of this Act, there was no specific Act for protecting women from undue discrimination and unjustified violence.
Though the Indian Penal Code had provisions, namely sections 304B and 498A, but they weren’t adequate and satisfactory in checking the atrocities committed against women. Thus, a desperate need was felt for an Act which could specifically cater to this cause and help women attain a dignified status, and henceforth the bill was passed by the legislature in 2005 and it was brought in application in 2006 and was touted by union minister Renuka Choudhary as a the most progressive gift for women.

Inception of the Act
Domestic violence is undoubtedly a human rights issue and serious deterrent to development of a nation. This particular Act has been enacted in keeping with the various guidelines given by several International conventions and declarations. The Vienna Accord of 1994 and the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action 1995 have acknowledged this. The United Nations Committee on Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in its General Recommendation No.XII (1989) has also recommended that State parties should act to protect women against violence of any kind especially that occurring within the family.
The phenomenon of domestic violence is widely prevalent but has remained largely invisible in the public domain. This enactment purported to be an additional violence curbing mechanism to the already existing sections 304B and 498A in IPC, which lay down the punishment for dowry death and cruelty and harassment against a women by her husband or his relatives.

Creditable features of the Act
An important advance made by the Act in understanding the nature of domestic violence has been in the combination of civil and criminal remedies. While civil remedies can be tailored to meet the circumstances of each case, criminal sanctions provide a greater deterrent effect among perpetrators.
The preamble to this Act reads like a definition and covers the entire subject matter of the Act. Apart from stating that the Act is intended to effectively protect the rights of a women and to give them a decent and dignified status, it stresses on the need of an ‘aggrieved women’ to seek immediate relief, compensation and also rehabilitation.
The Act establishes adequate machinery to ensure effective protection. The Act creates an extraordinary post of a Protection officer who is charged with the responsibility of taking expeditious steps for providing timely relief and it also grants authority to the Magistrate to give sufficient relief in the form of maintenance orders, custody orders and compensation. The Act also creates a novel agency called the ‘service providers’ who are entrusted with the job of filing Domestic Incident Reports with the Magistrate. The act by itself does not punish the perpetrator of domestic violence. But if a case discloses any offences punishable under IPC, CRPC or Dowry prohibition Act, the Magistrate may then, frame appropriate charges to either try the case himself or he may commit it to Sessions Court if he may deem fit.
This act contains five chapters and 37 sections. Its main features are firstly that the term 'domestic violence' has been made wide enough to encompass every possibility as it covers all forms of physical, sexual, verbal, emotional and economic abuse that can harm, cause injury to, endanger the health, safety, life, limb or well-being, either mental or physical of the aggrieved person. This is a genuinely wide definition and covers every eventuality. Secondly, the definition of an 'aggrieved' person' is equally wide and covers not just the wife but a woman who is the sexual partner of the male irrespective of whether she is his legal wife or not. The daughter, mother, sister, child (male or female), widowed relative, in fact, any woman residing in the household who is related in some way to the respondent, is also covered by the Act . The respondent under the definition given in the Act is "any male, adult person who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person" but so that his mother, sister and other relatives do not go scot free, the case can also be filed against relatives of the husband or male partner.
S.18 of the same chapter allows the magistrate to protect the woman from acts of violence or even "acts that are likely to take place" in the future and can prohibit the respondent from dispossessing the aggrieved person or in any other manner disturbing her possessions, entering the aggrieved person's place of work or, if the aggrieved person is a child, the school. The respondent can also be restrained from attempting to communicate in any form, whatsoever, with the aggrieved person, including personal, oral, written, electronic or telephonic contact". The respondent can even be prohibited from entering the room/area/house that is allotted to her by the court.
The Act allows magistrates to impose monetary relief and monthly payments of maintenance. The respondent can also be made to meet the expenses incurred and losses suffered by the aggrieved person and any child of the aggrieved person as a result of domestic violence and can also cover loss of earnings, medical expenses, loss or damage to property and can also cover the maintenance of the victim and her children . S.22 allows the magistrate to make the respondent pay compensation and damages for injuries including mental torture and emotional distress caused by acts of domestic violence.
The Act provides for penalty up to one-year imprisonment and/or a fine up to Rs. 20,000/- for and offence . The offence is also considered cognizable and non-bailable under Section 31 while Section 32 (2) goes even further and states, "Under the sole testimony of the aggrieved person, the court may conclude that an offence has been committed by the accused".
The Act significantly ensures speedy justice as the court has to start proceedings and have the first hearing within 3 days of the complaint being filed in court and every case must be disposed of within a period of sixty days of the first hearing.

A critique of the Act 

Women favoring Aspects
In the garb of providing protection, this legislation in fact, strikes at the very foundation of marriage by promoting intolerance and encouraging unnecessary litigation even for petty domestic disputes. The law is based on a totally wrong notion and assumes men as the sole perpetrators of domestic violence. This is altogether a wrong impression and only confirms the gender bias in favor of women created by this law. “Giving of such sweeping legal powers to women while withholding protection to male victims is tantamount to systematic legal victimization of men ”. The law is wholly gender specific and rules out any possibility of domestic violence against a man . The law confers rights in a woman without imposing any liability, while a man is overburdened with discriminative liabilities with total denial of rights.
The slack drafting of this law will allow cunning and unscrupulous women to teach a lesson to any of her male relative at her sole behest. Moreover any such frivolous claims will be treated as words of god or gospel of truth by virtue of this law . This has virtually empowered all women to punish men at their will. This law not only recognizes but also gives legal sanctions to apprehensions no matter how insignificant and fizzy, they are. The mere belief of a person, even a stranger, will be sufficient for reporting the matter to the protection officers. It can very easily become a weapon for women to extort money, as in such cases usually the police arrests the husband and in-laws. “This arbitrary decision of the police to favor the daughter-in-law is a newfound ethic, to protect the rights and liberalization of women, even though it violates the principles of natural justice ”. A bizarre aspect of this Act is that it does not distinguish between actual abuse and threat of abuse and gives equal weightage to even a likelihood of abuse . Also in regards to the notion of “emotional abuse, insults and verbal abuse” enshrined in the Act, the terms in itself are extremely relative and subjective, often depending on one’s mindset and shockingly, the husband does not have any recourse in case of any abuse by the wife.
Unlike other women protection laws, the Act almost gives a legal sanction to extortion of money by women under the guise of economic abuse . Refusal to pay any sum of money for whatsoever reason will attract the provisions of this law. Non-payment of rental related to the shared household will also constitute economic abuse even if the husband himself is devoid of sufficient resources or even if he is in jail. Another pertinent laxity that can be pointed out as also recently reiterated by the Supreme Court is that the definition of “shared household” as mentioned in the Act is vague and laid that
the parents independent property in which the husband does not have any share will not amount to “shared household”.

Other Anomalies in the Act
Another substantiation of the Act being unreasonable and excessive is that in relation to the right of residence wherein by including the divorced wives, former girlfriends and former live-in partners in the list of women facing domestic violence, this Act gives enough leeway to women to harass innocent men and turn the heat on their former partners. Now even a traitorous woman cannot be thrown out of house as she can easily threaten her husband or in-laws of false domestic violence charges as the Act expressly mentions that incase of absence of any other evidence, her sole testimony shall be relied upon by the Magistrate in deciding the existence and extent of violence. The Act almost gives a legal sanction to any relationship, which is not at all socially acceptable like the live-in relationship. In addition to this the respondent is totally deprived of his legitimate rights over his property as he cannot alienate or dispose if an order is passed under the Act. On the contrary there is an added liability on his part to arrange for an alternate accommodation or pay the rent for the same.
Another certain home breaking implication of this Act is that as consanguinity is a necessary aspect of marriage, and as matter of fact a ground for separation under the marriage laws, one of the provisions of this Act bars the husbands from even asking, leave apart pressurizing, their wives for sex . Another perturbing feature is that as a protective measure or more so a biased feature conferred by this Act in the form of prohibition of any sort of communication to be made by the husband if there is a prima facie case
An unusual oddity in this enactment is that the Magistrate has been entrusted with unaccountable power as he is invested with the responsibility to take cognizance of the case and also for executing his own orders in favor of the aggrieved women even without being approached for their execution. An additional disturbing aspect is that the Magistrate trying the case is required to evaluate not the individual incidence of violence, but the overall circumstances as well.
The major inappropriate implication would be that it would play down the chances of reconciliation in future. On one hand the Act punishes a man for forcing her wife to leave job while on other it provides maintenance to the very same wife. But the law does not provide for any such remedy to a male in any similar circumstance.
All the provisions of this Act, however, do not serve the purpose of effective implementation as the above examples, sometimes due to a lack of resources or due to extraneous factors. S.12 (4), for example, is a laudable provision, which makes it mandatory for the magistrate to hear a case within three days of the complaint being filed. The idea of prompt relief is carried on in s. 12(5), which directs the magistrate to finish hearing the case within six months of it reaching court. However, the overcrowding of courts makes it difficult to see if they can be practically realized.
A further criticism of the Act is with respect to S.14, which may prescribe counseling for either of the parties, and delay proceedings up to two months. As has been discussed earlier, addressal of domestic violence has always tended to focus on conciliation between the perpetrator and the victim, even within the criminal justice system. This is due to the judicial perceptions regarding the importance of preserving the family unit, even to the jeopardy of a victim of domestic violence. In recognition of this fact, a provision such as S.14 can be counterproductive in two ways. Firstly, it might jeopardize speedy disposal of the case, and secondly, it may also convince the aggrieved to continue in that situation without taking any further action.
The Act makes provision for the appointment of protection officers. Protection officers, as per the Act, are a group of officers whose duty is to assist the aggrieved party with the processing and completion of the domestic violence suit. The institution of protection officers is a useful one, emphasizing the need for societal intervention in order to prevent domestic violence, by directly addressing from an external standpoint the relationship of power and control in an abusive relationship. The problem however lies with the resources required for the creation of such a rung of officers
The Supreme Court verdict
Since the Act is written in a negative language, it is essential to consider the Supreme Court judgement in respect of such statutes. The SC has aptly stated in a recent case that if a provision of law is couched in negative language implying mandatory character then the Courts shall interpret the provision, keeping in view the entire content in which the provision came to be enacted, and shall hold the same to be directory though worded in negative form.
Also in the first case on this Act before the Supreme Court , the Court has admitted and established certain evident ambiguities in the Act.The court in this particular case discussed the scope of sections 2,12,17 and 19. As provided by section 17,the court can now order that she not only reside in the same house but that a part of the house can even be allotted to her for her personal use even if she has no legal claim or share in the property. The Act also ensures speedy justice as the court has to start proceedings and have the first hearing within 3 days of the complaint being filed in court and every case must be disposed of within a period of sixty days of the first hearing.
The facts of the case were that respondent was married to son of Appellants and after their marriage and Respondent and her husband were staying in house owned by husband’s mother. When Husband filed a divorce petition against the Respondent, the Respondent shifted to her parents place. She was prohibited to enter house of Appellants. She filed a Suit for a mandatory injunction to enable her to enter the house. The Trial Court granted temporary injunction restraining Appellants from interfering with right of Respondent to reside. On appeal, Senior Civil Judge dismissed temporary injunction application. The Respondent then filed a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. The Single Judge held that Respondent was entitled to reside in house, as that was her matrimonial home. Then the husband’s parents appealed and the SC held that the house in question belonged to mother in law of Respondent and not to Respondent’s husband and Respondent could not claim any right in said house. The Court also redefined the scope of various provisions relating to ‘shared household’ and compensation in the form of residential accommodation by stating that "Wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household, and a ‘shared household’ would only mean house belonging to or taken on rent by husband, or house which belongs to joint family of which husband is a member." The Court while deciding on the issue of alternative accommodation laid down that in regards to “Alternative accommodation under Section 19 (1)(f) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, claim for alternative accommodation can only be made against husband and not against in-laws or other relatives.”
Conclusion
The Act presently is heavily in favor of women. Chances of it being misused and scandalously abused are enormous. It can therefore, be well stated here, that this act could become a pawn in the hands of the “so called aggrieved” who can easily manipulate it for her advantage which can be well supported by these statistical researches, the most alarming of it being that in case of married couples, the male to female suicide ratio is 63:37 thus confirming that men are the ultimate targets. This Act should have ideally included stringent penal provisions for curtailing the instances of abuse and mishandling, but herein, instead various opportunities have been made available which can ultimately lead to its grave misuse and can thus act as a catalyst for breaking homes. Thus, this Act does not contain any provisions for creating awareness or for strengthening and preserving family as an institution or even providing chances for reconciliation or even scope for improvement to “the husband”. The main beneficiaries of this Act will obviously be women of propertied upper class. But there is no doubt that given the hypocritical, patriarchal and insensitive nature of the society, this Act would definitely be instrumental in putting an end to all the degradation and brutality meted out to women.
It is eventually, the neo collectivist and neo socialist approach which is needed in the society that can essentially free both men and women from shackles of brutality and ultimately put them on an equal pedestal in all respects. Women, who have for decades been silent victims of oppression and enslavement will now have a better chance of fighting the injustice without slightest of hesitation and it can be well summed up with the quote by Marx-that equal laws cannot be applied to unequal people . Thus, any enactment, which forcefully subjects a section of society to conduct and “serve” the other section at its willful pleasure, would only enhance the level of oppression in the society and leave incurable marks on the face of the most democratic society.